Price Discrimination and Economic Journals

An analysis of pricing by economics journal publishers shows that most publishers initially charge libraries and individual subscribers the same price. Over time, however, almost all eventually engage in price discrimination. The few publishers that never price-discriminate seem to be purchasing an explicit non-profit-maximizing pricing strategy. Once discrimination occurs, library prices rise faster than individual subscriber prices. These results are consistent with theoretical predictions.

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	Rosenbaum, David I Professor of Economics Expertise: Antitrust Managerial Economics Public Utilities Economics CBA 360 P.O. Box 880489 University of Nebraska-Lincoln Lincoln, NE 68588-0489, USA Phone: (402) 472-2318 Fax: (402) 472-9700 drosenbaum1@unl.edu	Rosenbaum, David I	Economics