Pricing Stratefies in Supegames with Capacity Constraints: Some Evidence from the U.S. Portland Cement Industry

Theory demonstrates that demand variations can have nonmonotonic effects on pricing in supergames with capacity constraints. Furthermore, this nonmonotonic relationship can be a function of capacity utilization rates. Time series data from 25 regional cement markets are used to examine this results empirically. No statistically significant relationship is found between demand variations, pricing and excess capacity.

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	Rosenbaum, David I Professor of Economics Expertise: Antitrust Managerial Economics Public Utilities Economics CBA 360 P.O. Box 880489 University of Nebraska-Lincoln Lincoln, NE 68588-0489, USA Phone: (402) 472-2318 Fax: (402) 472-9700 drosenbaum1@unl.edu	Rosenbaum, David I	Economics