An Empirical Test of the Effects of Excess Capacity in Price Setting, Capacity-Constrained Supergames

In a multi-period game, industry excess capacity may act to deter firms from cheating on a non-cooperative oligopoly price. A model is developed that translates the deterrrent influence of excess capacity into predictions about the relationship between excess capacity and oligopoly price-cost margins. The model is tested with time-series data from the U.S. aluminum industry. Results are consistent with those predicted by the model.

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	Rosenbaum, David I Professor of Economics Expertise: Antitrust Managerial Economics Public Utilities Economics CBA 360 P.O. Box 880489 University of Nebraska-Lincoln Lincoln, NE 68588-0489, USA Phone: (402) 472-2318 Fax: (402) 472-9700 drosenbaum1@unl.edu	Rosenbaum, David I	Economics