Research

Performance Implications of Mismatched Governance Regimes across External and Internal Relationships

This article examines how a manufacturer's governance of an external supplier relationship affects its performance toward a downstream retail customer. In line with sociological and economic theory, a manufacturer's reliance on supplier norms and incentives, respectively, promotes performance. However, the performance effect of each external governance mechanism weakens in the presence of a different governance regime within the manufacturer firm itself. Specifically, internal incentives weaken the effect of external norms, and internal norms weaken the effect of external incentives. From a practical standpoint, these findings point to the difficulty of managing sets of relationships that involve different parties and mechanisms. From a theoretical standpoint, they point to the complex interplay between social norms and economic incentives in driving performance outcomes.

Publication Information
Article Title: Performance Implications of Mismatched Governance Regimes across External and Internal Relationships
Journal: Journal of Marketing (Mar, 2011)
75 (2)
Author(s): Kumar, Alok;  Heide, J. B.;  Wathne, K. H.
Researcher Information
    
Kumar, Alok
Kumar, Alok
Associate Professor
Expertise:
  • Business-to-Business Marketing
  • Marketing Channels Management
  • Marketing Strategy
Marketing
CoB 335S
P.O. Box 880492
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Lincoln, NE 68588-0492, USA
Phone: (402) 472-3378
Fax: (402) 472-9777
akumar5@unl.edu