Managerial Compensation and Private Foundation Performance

In a large sample of US private foundations, we examine the association between CEO compensation and an accounting-based measure of performance, administrative efficiency. We document a positive pay-performance association across time within foundations, but a negative association across foundations. We interpret our evidence as follows: some foundation boards reward CEOs for high administrative efficiency, which results in a positive pay-performance association. However, some foundations are poorly monitored relative than others, resulting in higher CEO compensation and lower efficiency.

Publication Information
Article Title: Managerial Compensation and Private Foundation Performance
Journal: Financial Accountability and Management (2018)
Author(s): Allen, Arthur C;  McAllister, Brian
Researcher Information
Allen, Arthur C
Allen, Arthur C
Associate Professor of Accountancy
  • Financial Accounting
  • Governmental and Nonprofit Accounting
CoB 445 J
P.O. Box 880488
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Lincoln, NE 68588-0488, USA
Phone: (402) 472-3275
Fax: (402) 472-4100