Insider Trading and Pay-Performance Sensitivity: An Empirical Analysis

We examine whether the sensitivity of pay to performance is associated with the amount of insider trading that managers undertake. Because insider trading profits represent an alternative form of compensation, we expect that firms will consider the compensation component provided by insider trading when designing remuneration contracts. Employing a proxy for insider trading that captures the degree to which managers trade on private information, we find evidence that an increased (a decreased) level of insider trading is associated with a decreased (an increased) pay-performance sensitivity.

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	Allen, Arthur C Associate Professor of Accountancy Expertise: Financial Accounting Governmental and Nonprofit Accounting Accountancy CBA 388 P.O. Box 880488 University of Nebraska-Lincoln Lincoln, NE 68588-0488, USA Phone: (402) 472-3275 Fax: (402) 472-4100 aallen1@unl.edu	Allen, Arthur C	Accountancy