Research

Pricing Stratefies in Supegames with Capacity Constraints: Some Evidence from the U.S. Portland Cement Industry

Theory demonstrates that demand variations can have nonmonotonic effects on pricing in supergames with capacity constraints. Furthermore, this nonmonotonic relationship can be a function of capacity utilization rates. Time series data from 25 regional cement markets are used to examine this results empirically. No statistically significant relationship is found between demand variations, pricing and excess capacity.

Publication Information
Article Title: Pricing Stratefies in Supegames with Capacity Constraints: Some Evidence from the U.S. Portland Cement Industry
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization (1991)
v. 9 iss. 4 pp. 497-511
Author(s): Rosenbaum, David I;  Iwand, Thomas
Researcher Information
    
Rosenbaum, David I
Rosenbaum, David I
Associate Director of the Bureau of Business Research,
Expertise:
  • Forensic Economics
  • Applied Microeconomics
  • Cost-Benefit Analysis
Economics
CoB 525 J
P.O. Box 880489
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Lincoln, NE 68588-0489, USA
Phone: (402) 472-2318
Fax: (402) 472-9700
drosenbaum1@unl.edu